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Abs t rac t 
Recent research indicates that the two hemispheres of the human brain 
serve different functions when processing visual information. 
Specifically the left hemisphere, for most individuals, is 
specialized for an analytic or sequential type of processing and the 
right hemisphere is specialized for a holistic or gestalt type of 
processing. However this dichotomy is not always found, and it is 
hypothesized that individual subject differences may partially 
account for the somewhat inconsistent results in the research 
literature. The present study attempts to examine the effect of one 
individual difference dimension upon process latera1ization . 
Subjects were classified into two types, Type 1 and Type II, based on 
previously established criteria. Type I individuals are 
characterized as having only a holistic processing capability, while 
Type II individuals have both holistic and analytic processing 
capabilities. This individual difference variable is hypothesized to 
have an effect upon the analytic/holistic latera1ization dichotomy 
within the two hemispheres of the brain. The subjects in the present 
study were divided into Type I and Type II subject groups. However 
the low incidence of Type I subjects observed precludes any 
meaningful comparison between the Type I and Type II groups. The 
data from subgroups of subjects that were observed were examined for 
analytic/holistic latera1ization effects. It was hypothesized that 
process latera 1ization would occur in the Type II subjects, since 
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these individuals have been described as having dua1-processing 
capabilities. Functional analytic/holistic differences between the 
two hemispheres were not found. Future research is suggested to 
clarify the role of individual differences along the Type I/Type II 
and analytic/holistic dichotomies within the hemispheric 
specialization researcli literature. 
Individual Differencps in 
La lera I ization of Cognitive Processes: 
Type I and Type II Processors 
A commonly used method for investigating ways in which the human 
brain processes visual information is a same-different comparison 
task. Using this procedure, a trial consists of two simultaneously 
or successively presented stimuli that are either the same or vary 
along some experimenter-manipulated dimension, and the subject is 
asked to judge whether the stimuli are the same or different. 
Typically, studies have found that the more dissimilar the two 
stimuli are, the faster is the reaction time (RT) to make a response 
of "different". In addition, "same" responses have been found to be 
much faster than the average "different" response (Bamber, 1969; 
Bindra, Donderi, and Nishisato, 1968; Egeth, 1966; Hawkins, 1969; 
Nickerson, 1972). This is known as the "fast-same" phenomenon. 
There has been little agreement among researchers as to the 
methodological procedures or cognitive mechanisms that account for 
these observations. Felfoldy (1974), Krueger (1973), and Williams 
(1972) have suggested that the same-different phenomena may be due to 
biased stimulus sampling. In the typical same-different experiment, 
the total number of possible "same" trials is less than the total 
number of possible "different" trials. This follows from the fact 
that there are only n ways to achieve all possible stimulus 
combinations for "same" trials (where n = the total number of 
u 
stimiiLL), but the total number of possible "different" trials is 
jifn-l) (Nickerson, lh7J; Silverman & Goldberg, 1975 ). This is 
because the "same" trials utilize stimuli that are indeed, exactly 
the same, hence the individual stimuli that compose "same" trials are 
used more often than the individual "different" stimuli in order to 
achieve a .50 probability that a given trial will actually be "same" 
or "different". In other words, since "same" and "different" pairs 
occur with equal frequency, the possibility that any given pair of 
stimuli are repeated is greater for the "same" trials. Williams 
(1972) and Krueger (1973) suggest that RTs to "different" stimuli 
would tend to be slower than RTs to "same" stimuli because each 
"different" combination is novel. Since each "same" pair eventually 
involves repetition, they are more likely to produce faster RTs. 
Williams (1972) and Kreuger (1973) systematically varied the 
frequency of occurrence of specific stimuli, including "same" pairs, 
and found a significant effect of stimulus frequency on RT; the more 
frequently appearing stimuli had shorter RTs. 
As a test of this proposition, Silverman (1973) used a 
same-different paradigm in which no specific stimulus pair was 
repeated. Silverman found that RT to "same" pairs of five-digit 
numbers was still significantly faster than RT to "different" pairs. 
Nickerson (1973), in addition to pointing out several possible 
methodological and empirical flaws in Williams' (1972) study, varied 
the frequency of occurrence of specific stimuli and found that 
repetition effects alone could not account for the "fast-same" 
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phenomena. Also, the results of Kreuger's (1973) experiment are 
equivocal since the difference between "same" and "different" KT was 
also significant when stimulus frequency differences were controlled. 
Thus it appears that sheer frequency of "same" pairs can not account 
for the "fast-same" phenomenon. 
Several models of visual stimulus processing have been 
postulated to account for the "fast-same" phenomenon. Most common 
among the various models are those that assume the operation of a 
single-process type comparison. Some researchers have proposed 
various stimulus "priming" models (e.g., Beller, 1971; Grill, 1971; 
Proctor, 1981). According to these models, during successive 
presentations of stimuli, the first stimulus acts as a prime for the 
second. If the second stimulus is the same as the first, a fast 
"same" response can be made since encoding the second stimulus is 
facilitated by the priming effects of the first stimulus. When the 
second stimulus is different, there is no facilitation effect, but 
rather an inhibition effect occurs which results in increased KT. 
Evidence for the facilitation of priming effects can also be found in 
the verbal learning hierarchies and linguistic conceptual 
organizations research literature (Collins & Quillian, 1969; Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt , 1971). 
While priming models appear to account for "same" responses 
being much faster than "different" responses, they suffer from a lack 
of genera1izabi1ity . Priming, by definition, can occur only with 
successive stimulus presentations, that is, some degree of temporal 
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separ.ition between stimuli is required (Bagnara, Boles, Simion, k 
Umilta, 1982). This is assuming, of course, that simultaneously 
presented stimuli are indeed processed simultaneously, an assumption 
which has apparently gone unchallenged. Although Proctor (1981) 
argues that the same-different results occur only with successive 
stimulus presentations, studies have indicated that the "fast-same" 
phenomenon can be found using simultaneous stimulus presentations, 
when priming effects can not operate (Bagnara, Boles, Simion, & 
Umilta, 1982; Nickerson, 1973). Clearly, stimulus priming models are 
inadequate in trying to understand all "fast-same" data since priming 
effects can occur only with successive stimulus presentations. 
Other researchers have emphasized the comparison process itself, 
and a single-process, se1f-terminating type comparison model has been 
proposed to account for some same-different comparison task results 
(Egeth, 1966; Hawkins, 1969). This single-process model states that 
features of the two stimuli are compared and as soon as a difference 
is detected, a "different" response is made. The comparison process 
is analytical in nature, in that stimulus features are analyzed 
sequentially. This model can explain the decrease in RT as the two 
stimuli become increasingly dissimilar since the more disparate 
features there are, the sooner a disparate feature will be detected 
and a "different" response made. The single-process model also has 
an advantage over stimulus "priming" models in that comparisons can 
be made with either simultaneous or successive presentations. 
Difficulty arises however, with regard to the frequent observation 
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that "same" responses are faster than the average "hifCerent" 
response. Under a single-process, feature comparison model, "same" 
responses should be slower than the average "different" response 
since a "same" response can be emitted only after all possible 
feature comparisons have been made. It would appear that another 
comparison process is responsible for "same" responses being, faster 
than the average "different" response. Accordingly, several 
researchers have proposed a two-process model to explain some 
same-different comparison task results. "Different" responses are 
thought to originate from an ana Iytic-type, feature comparison 
process, much the same as the single-process type model described 
above, and "same" responses are thought to be determined by a gestalt 
or holistic comparison process, with both processes operating 
simultaneously in the same person (Bamber, 1969; Hock, 1973; Keuss , 
1977; Nickerson, 1972; Silverman and Goldberg, 1975; Taylor, 1976a, 
1976b). An analytic processor would necessarily compare each 
stimulus feature until a difference was found, hence the more 
dissimilar the second (probe stimulus) is to the first (criterion 
stimulus) the quicker a difference can be detected and a "dilferent" 
response made. A gestalt or holistic type processor could detect 
sameness faster than an analytic type of processor because the 
holistic processor would not waste time comparing each stimulus 
feature, but instead would compare the stimuli as wholes. A 
two-process model seems to represent more closely the existing data 
on visual comparisons. Thus Silverman and Goldberg (1975) state: 
s 
"There seems to be no way ot explaining the present results (of their 
study) within any single-process system, and therefore some 
dual-process system seems the only workable theoretical framework 
that accommodates the ' same 1 - 1different' data" (p. 19 3). 
It should be noted that many of the early studies of visual 
stimulus processing, while employing considerable variability in 
design, were concerned with how the brain as a whole processes visual 
information. Typically, these studies utilized stimuli that were 
presented in the subject's center visual field (CVF). This procedure 
assured that the visual images of the stimuli would be equally 
accessible at the same point in time across all neuronal tracts of a 
subject's visual system, including those within the two hemispheres 
of the brain. However, delineation of specific parameters of a 
phenomenon are often achieved by varying one or more aspect of an 
experimental situation and comparing the results of this new 
situation with that of the old. This principle is especially true of 
the information processing literature. By manipulating visual field 
of stimulus presentation (among other variables), researchers are 
able to examine hemispheric differences in visual stimuli processing. 
In recent years much attention in cognitive and physiological 
psychology has been devoted to hemispheric specialization of function 
within the human brain. The initial impetus for hemispheric 
specialization research was provided by Sperry and Gazzauiga 
(Gazzaniga , Bogon, £ Sperry, 1955; Sperry, 1964, 1968, 1974). Part 
of Sperry's technique involves surgically separating the two cerebral 
u 
hemispheres by severing the connecting tissue, a procedure called a 
commissurotomy. Originally designed to alleviate the behavioral 
effects of severe epilepsy, this procedure allows for exquisite 
experimental control over many variables. However, it is beyond the 
capability of the average researcher. Fortunately, simply varying 
visual field of stimulus presentation circumvents the obvious ethical 
and procedural problems associated with commissurotomy. The 
uiulerlying optical and neuro-anatomicaI mechanisms that allow such 
non-invasive investigations are deceptively simple. 
The retina of each eye can be divided into two equal areas. The 
retinal tissue that extends from the fovea (the approximate center of 
the eye) towards the nose is called the nasal retina. That part 
extending from the fovea towards the ear is called the temporal 
retina. When a subject is fixated on a point directly ahead, all 
stimuli in the subject's right-visual-fie Id (RVF) are projected to 
the temporal retina of the left eye and the nasal retina of the right 
eye. Similarly, all stimuli in the subject's left-visuaI-fie1d (LVF ) 
are projected to the temporal retina of the right eye and the nasal 
retina of the left eye. This process is called lateralizing the 
optical input of a visual stimulus, or simply, 1 atera1ization of a 
stimulus to the right or left visual field. Furthermore, the bundles 
of nerve fibers forming the optical tracts that extend from the 
temporal retina of each eye project to the ipsilateral or same-side 
cerebral hemisphere, where further processing of the visual image 
takes place. However, those nerve fibers that extend from the nasal 
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retina of each eye cros$ over at the optic chiasm anti project to the 
contra1 atera1 or opposite-side cerebral hemisphere. In effect, any 
stimulus appearing in a subject's RVF has direct access to the left 
hemisphere (LH) and any stimulus in the LVF has direct access to the 
right hemisphere (RH). Naturally information transfer from one 
hemisphere to the other is achieved through the corpus callosum and 
other minor commissural tissue, but this transfer takes a finite 
amount of measurable time. It can be readily seen that, using a 
same-different comparison task, RT differences to stimuli laterali^ed 
to the LVF and RVF can be attributed to processing differences 
between the two hemispheres. 
Using this procedure (and others), it has been postulated that 
the two cerebral hemispheres differ with respect to the type of 
stimulus, and the type of stimulus processing, each is specialized 
for. This supposition is aptly stated by Oimorul and Beaumont (1974): 
Another proposition about the two hemispheres is that although 
each may proceed towards its solution of a task or problem, 
each may do so in a rather different way, thereby 
increasing the chance of a satisfactory solution but also 
distributing the load between the cerebral hemispheres 
by the introduction of special modes of function, (p. 49) 
One system involving specialization of cerebral function is the 
verba1/visuospatia 1 dichotomy. It has generally been recognized that 
the LH is superior to the RH in processing verbal stimuli, while the 
RII is superior in processing visuospatial stimuli. There is 
certainly no dearth of research literature supporting this dichotomy 
(see Dimond & Beaumont, I97''4) and Bradshaw & Nettleton, 19BI lor 
extensive reviews). 
From studies involving lateralized tachistoscopic presentation 
of faces (Geffen, Bradshaw, and Wallace, 1971, exps. 1 and II; 
Patterson & Bradshaw, 1975), digits (Geffen et al., 1971, exps. Ill, 
IV, and V), and letters (Cohen, 1973; Martin, 1979) it has also been 
suggested that the left hemisphere (LM) acts as an analytic or serial 
type processor while the right hemisphere (RH) acts as a gestalt or 
holistic type processor. This analytic/holistic dichotomy at first 
glance appears to be another rather simple, parsimonious functional 
differentiation between the two hemispheres, but not all studies in 
the literature are in complete agreement with it (Sergent, 1982), 
while others find little or no evidence whatsoever to support it. 
For example, in a study by Simion, Bagnara, Bisiacchi, Ronsato, 
and Umilta (1980) subjects were required to make same-different 
comparisons on three types of visually presented stimuli. The 
stimuli were normal letters, letters on which a mental transformation 
(rotation) had to be performed, and geometric shapes. Part of the 
researchers' interest was to determine if there would be a 
significant visual field X type of stimulus interaction, or if there 
would be a significant visual field X match (same/di fferent , or type 
of process) interaction. Simion et al. found the former interaction 
significant but not the latter. It is suggested that, at least in 
this experiment, the type of stimuli (verha 1/visuospatia 1 ) were more 
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f midamentaL than the process (analytic/gesta11 ) in determining 
functional hemispheric asymmetries. 
Alternatively, in a comparatively simple study by Egeth and 
Epstein (1972) subjects were presented with two letters, all 
capitals, one above the other, and the field of presentation was 
varied. Subjects were required to make same-different comparisons on 
the letters. Egeth and Epstein found a left visual field-right 
hemisphere (LVF-KH) advantage for "different" judgements and a right 
visual field-left hemisphere (RVF-LH) advantage for "same" 
judgements. Of course, these results are just the opposite of what 
one would expect if the LH were an analytic processor and the RH a 
holistic processor. 
Bagnara, et al. (1982), in a direct test of the 
analytic/holistic dichotomy, used a paradigm developed by Taylor 
(1976a) to require subjects to make same-different comparisons on 
simultaneously and successively presented letter pairs. Visual field 
of presentation was varied to assess possible laterality effects. 
The letters were composed from a fixed set of line segments and the 
similarity of the letters was systematically varied by having the 
probe letters differ on one, two, or three line segments from the 
criterion letters. On "same" trials the two letters were simply 
repeated. While bagnara et al. found that "same" responses were 
faster than "different" responses, and RT to "different" responses 
decreased with increasing dissimilarity between the two letters, they 
did not find a significant visual field X match (process) 
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interaction. It is difticult to explain the lack of an 
analytic/holistic latera1ization effect when, if analytic and 
holistic processing modes are indeed lateralized to the LH and KH 
respectively, one should have been apparent. 
It is even more difficult to compare the results of the Bagnara 
et al. (1982) study with other studies because hemispheric function 
experiments differ on so many variables such as response mode, 
inter-stimulus-interva1, type of stimuli, method of presentation, and 
subject characteristics. Comparisons among experiments are tenuous 
at best. In fact the state of the existing 1 atera1ization of 
cognitive function researcli may have been described best by Friedman 
and Pol son (1981 ) : 
. . . the most frequent findings to emerge in well over 100 
years of research are (a) the apparent capriciousness of the 
phenomena, that is, the ease with which relatively superficial 
changes of stimuli, instructions or other task parameters can 
switch performance advantage from one hemisphere to the other; 
(b) the large amount of data that defy replication across 
laboratories and paradigms; (c) the wide range of individual 
performance differences observed on tasks that are supposed 
to be lateralized one way or the other, even among populations 
suspected to be relatively homogeneous in their degree of 
latera1ization of function, such as right-handed males; 
(d) the lack of consistency within individuals in the degree of 
latera1ization they show across time and tasks; and finally, 
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(e) the absence of a global theory that can adequately 
explain the factors underlying even the existing regularities 
that have been observed. (pp. 10.31 -1032) 
Friedman and Poison (1981) propose a multiple-resource approach 
to functional hemispheric latera1ization. The basic idea underlying 
their multiple resource theory is that the available cognitive 
resources necessary to successfully perform a given task are many, 
each existing in different degrees, and at least some possibly 
differentially represented within the two hemispheres. 
To use an example from Friedman and Poison (1981), suppose 
subjects are required to learn a list of visually presented nouns 
that are orthographica 11y and phonemically dissimilar. The subjects 
may choose to use a phonemic or semantic style of learning, or they 
may choose to focus on the global shapes of the words, or even some 
combination of the above, yet the task performance level may be the 
same for all the subjects. Thus people may use different strategies 
to obtain the same results. The types of resources used by a subject 
are a function of such subject-task parameters as task difficulty, 
response complexity, visual field, exposure duration, stimulus type 
and quality, practice, visual acuity, sex of subject, handedness, and 
so forth, and the particular resources or subset of resources 
required for stimulus processing. The subset of resources required 
by a particular task is called the resource composition. 
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In addition, successful task performance may require the 
resource composition of only the Lit, the RH, or some combination of 
both, working together, via information transfer through the corpus 
callosum. Thus the resource composition of one hemisphere may be 
qualitatively and quantitatively different from the resource 
composition of the other hemisphere, hence task performance level 
during lateralized stimulus presentations may not necessarily be 
equal for all subjects for any given subject-task parameter or 
combination of parameters. 
The implications of such a multiple-resource model are enormous 
because such a model, if operationally developed, can potentially 
explain many of the disparate and inconsistent findings of many 
laterality studies. Friedman and Poison maintain that manipulating 
such subject-task parameters as visual field, exposure duration, 
handedness, type of stimuli, and so forth, will change the 
hemispheric resource composition needed to perform a given task and 
thus may affect differential hemispheric processing level. 
If a task can be performed using several different resource 
compositions and if subjects differ in which resources are available 
to them, then we would expect somewhat inconsistent results if 
relevant subject-task parameters are not controlled for. Thus 
Friedman and Poison (1981) state that: 
. . . in addition to the fact that tasks vary in the extent to 
which they demand resources from one or the other hemisphere, 
we assume that subjects vary in the extent to which the 
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resources of either hemisphere can be efficiently applied 
to performance. . . we recognize that individual differences 
in the factors above are important parameters of information 
processing, so that it is probably most appropriate to speak 
in terms of degrees of latera I ization for a given person 
under a particular set of circumstances. (pp. 1053-1054) 
While Friedman and Poison do not explicitly indicate some 
possible cognitive resources (we can assume analytic and holistic 
processors to be two) and their nature and degree of latera 1 ization , 
if any, the approach taken by Friedman and Poison is unique in that 
it attempts to unify the sometimes widely different findings in the 
hemispheric specialization literature through a model that 
discriminates between traditional experimenter-manipulated variables 
and the individual differences in cognitive resources that a person 
brings to a task situation. Friedman and Poison (1981) conclude that 
". . . efforts to delineate what the hemispheres are specialized for 
may yield conclusions that depend as much upon the particular people 
chosen for the study as they do upon whatever experimental 
environment those individuals have encountered" (p. 1054). 
Some attempt has been made to identify certain groups of 
individuals for whom lateralization of cognitive processes may not be 
as pronounced as for other groups. In particular, evidence suggests 
that females, as a population, may not be as completely lateralized 
in hemispheric specialization as males (Kimura , 1969). Evidence also 
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suggests that Left-handed individuals are more diffuse in terms of 
lateralization of cognitive function (Hecan & Sauguet, 1971; 
Beaumont, 1974 ). 
The hemispheric specialization differences between males vs. 
females or left-handed vs. right-handed individuals are certainly 
noteworthy, and many of the more recent studies control for these 
differences to more adequately insure subject homogeneity. Obviously 
this eliminates a possible source of confounding. However, 
individual differences of these kinds are not entirely the types to 
which Friedman and Poison (1981) are referring. These variables are 
merely superficial c1assificatory variables and as such, it is 
difficult to infer a cause-and-ef feet re la t ionsli i p between an 
individual's class and his or her degree of latera 1 ization . 
Exposition of these variables should not elevate them to the status 
of explanation. They offer little by way of explaining hemispheric 
performance differences between classes of subjects. 
Furthermore, it is commonly assumed that these cI assificatory 
variables represent the only relevant subject dimensions involved in 
latera1ization effects. However, the cognitive abilities to which 
Friedman and Poison are referring may interact with male/female and 
left-handed/right-handed classifications, and may be more fundamental 
than these classifications. 
Interestingly, there have been very few attempts in the 
literature to identify other individual differences in visual 
stimulus processing (Cooper, 1976; Cooper & Podgorney, 1976; Hock, 
1 -s 
1973; Hock, Gordon, & Marcus, 1974; Levy, 1983; Simmons, 1982). 
However, as Friedman and Poison (1981) point out, subjects may bring 
individual cognitive differences to a particular experimental task 
that may confound the results of the experiment if the data are 
pooled, as is usually done. 
In an attempt to identify other types of individual differences 
using non-latera 1 ized stimulus presentations, Cooper ( 1976) 
identified two subgroups of individuals who apparently used two quite 
different cognitive processes in a same-different comparison task. 
Subjects were exposed to five "standard" nonsense shapes, each 
different in the number of angles that composed the shape. Each 
standard had seven "distractors". One distractor was a mirror image 
of its standard and the other six were random perturbations of the 
standard which varied systematically in their similarity to the 
standard. Each standard-distractor pair was presented successively, 
and the subjects were required to judge whether the stimuli were the 
same or different. On half of the trials the stimuli were the same 
and on the other half they were different. 
Reaction time data were analyzed for each subject and two 
distinct patterns were noted. For some subjects "same" responses 
were faster than "different" responses, "different" responses were 
unaffected by the similarity of the test stimulus to the criterion, 
and RTs and error rates were unrelated. Cooper called these subjects 
"Type I". For the other subjects "same" responses were slower than 
the average "different" response, but "same" responses were faster 
than "different" responses when the stimuli were highly similar. 
Also, KI dt^creased with increasing dissimilarity between the stimuli, 
and there was a positive correlation between RT and error rates. 
These subjects were labelled "Type II". 
Cooper (1976) explains the performance of the Type I subjects in 
terms of their using a rapid, single process, holistic type of 
comparison. If the outcome of this comparison produces a positive 
match, the "same" response is executed. If the outcome is negative, 
the "different" response is made by default. This single-process 
model accounts for the rapid "same" responses and the somewhat slower 
"different" responses, which require additional processing time. 
The performance of the Type II subjects cannot be so easily 
explained. Cooper (1976) interprets the performance of the Type II 
subjects in terms of a dual-process model in which independent but 
simultaneous operation of a holistic and analytic processor is 
assumed. The "same" processor compares the two stimuli ho I istica I ly , 
as do the Type I subjects, but the decrease in RT as the stimuli 
become increasingly dissimilar also indicates the operation of an 
analytic type processor. This analytic processor compares features 
of the two stimuli, checking for differences. The more differences 
there are, or the more dissimilar the two stimuli, the quicker a 
difference can be detected and a "different" response made. 
Similarly, Hock, Gordon, and Marcus (1974) used embedded and 
intact figures in a same-different comparison task to find evidence 
for individual differences in visual stimuli processing. One group 
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of subjects, identified by Hock et al. as being "structural", were 
affected by the rotation of intact figures. They were also less able 
to detect embedded figures. Another group of subjects, termed 
"analytic", were not affected by stimulus rotation and they were 
better able to detect embedded figures. The design utilized by Hock 
et al. sought to identify a procedure for classifying subjects into 
dichotomous catagories. It's utility is questioned because as 
Simmons (1982) points out, classification is determined solely on the 
basis of the presence or absence of a rotation effect on RT and does 
little to address either a single-process or dual-process theory of 
visual stimulus processing. Cooper's (1976) study however, employed 
multiple criteria for determining Type I or Type II classification. 
These criteria are directly relevant to single-process and 
dual-process theories. Also, subjects in the Hock et al. study were 
required to give only a "same" response and ignore "different" trials 
which results in an unneccessary loss of seemingly pertinent data. 
Simmons (1982) concludes that Cooper's (1976) methodology is more 
appropriate for investigating individual differences in visual 
stimulus processing. 
Clearly the individual differences identified by Cooper (1976) 
have implications for the multiple-resource model postulated by 
Friedman and Poison (1981), and hence laterality studies in general, 
which attempt to identify asymmetrical hemispheric processing 
abilities by aggregating data across all subjects. By treating a 
Type I or Type II processing preference as a subject-task parameter, 
one could control for tliis variable and provide a more adequate test 
of latera1ization effects. In addition, any subsequent 
latera 1ization of cognitive processes could possibly provide a more 
operationa1ized indication of some cognitive resources, which 
Friedman and Poison fail to do. 
Perhaps as Friedman and Poison (1981) suggest, combining the 
data from subjects who differ in their cognitive resources, or at 
least in their processing preferences, will lead to confounding and 
confusing results. Thus it is hypothesized that 1 atera1ization 
effects along a given dimension (e.g. analytic vs. holistic 
processing) may be characteristic of only certain subgroups of 
people. 
The present study was designed to test just such an hypothesis 
by first classifying subjects as Type I and Type II processors, then 
examining the data of each group for evidence of analytic and 
holistic process latera1ization . Specifically, the study used 
Cooper's (1976) criteria for classifying subjects as Type I or Type 
II. In addition, two different classes of stimuli were used to 
examine the effects of stimulus type, if any, upon process 
latera1ization . Random nonsense shapes were used to extend Cooper's 
(1976) procedure to lateralized stimuli presentations, and they were 
compared with the verbal stimuli developed by Taylor (1976a). Both 
types of stimuli are well suited for use in the same-different 
paradigm since both easily provide for differing degrees of criterion 
and probe dissimlarity by manipulating the physical characteristics 
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of the stimuli. Generally, the study sought to determine the role, 
if any, of the Type l/Type II dichotomy in latera 1 ization of 
cognitive function. Specifically, it was hypothesized that, given 
the analytic/holistic dichotomy, latera 1 ization of process type would 
appear only in Type II subjects, since these subjects have previously 
been described as possessing duaI-processing capabilities (Cooper, 
1976). For these subjects the LH should show an advantage for making 
"different" responses and the RH should show an advantage for making 
"same" responses. The Type I subjects however, should show no 
latera1ization of cognitive functions, but rather KT to "same" 
responses should be equal for both hemispheres. 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects were obtained from two large introductory 
psychology courses taught at Georgia Southern College, during winter 
quarter, 1985. The subjects consisted of 30 undergraduate 
right-handed males, all of whom had no immediate familial history of 
left-handedness. Subjects were initially screened for handedness and 
familial history from a larger subject pool by using the questions 
portion of the Harris Tests of Lateral Dominance (Harris, , see 
Appendix A), plus additional questions concerning familial 
left-handedness. No individual was used who indicated using his left 
hand for more than three items on the questions portion of the Harris 
Tests, and who had a family member who was predominantly left-handed. 
All subjects who passed this global screening were invited to 
participate after they had been individually screened for appropriate 
visual acuity using a Snellen chart. No subject was used whose 
visual acuity was not at least 20/40, corrected or uncorrected. The 
subjects were paid for their participation in the study. 
Appa ra tu s 
Following Cooper (1976), the stimuli used to classify subjects 
as Type I or Type II consisted of nonsense shapes generated by 
Attneave and Arnould (1956) Method I for the construction of random 
nonsense shapes. Cooper used five standard nonsense shapes and seven 
distractor nonsense shapes per standard. Since Cooper's 
classification study required several hours and experimental sessions 
per subject, a reduction in the number of stimuli was used in the 
present study to decrease the total time needed to classify a 
subject. The stimuli used in the present study consisted of three 
standard shapes and five distractor shapes per standard. They were 
the same ones used by Simmons (1982) to classify subjects as Type I 
or Type II. Each of the five perturbations per standard varied 
systematically in their similarity to the standard. Cooper (1976) 
used a reflected or mirror image of the standard as one of the 
distractor stimuli, but since the use of the reflected stimulus was 
not crucial to the subject's classification, it was not used in the 
present study. 
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Each stimulus was black on a white circular field. At a viewing 
distance of 921 mm, the circular field subtended 4 deg of visual 
angle and the stimulus itself subtended 2 deg of visual angle. The 
viewing distance was the same for all stimuli. Each pair of 
standard/distractor shapes was presented in 3 orientations of 0 deg, 
120 deg, and 240 deg. 
A different set of random nonsense shapes was used to examine 
latera Iization effects. This different set also consisted of three 
standard shapes and five distractors per standard, but instead of 
using three different standard/distractor orientations, visual field 
was varied. The standard stimuli were generated using Attneave and 
Arnould (1936) Method I for the construction of random nonsense 
shapes. Cooper and Podgorney (1976) detail the construction of the 
distractor stimuli. During all stimuli presentations the standard 
stimulus appeared in the center visual field (CVE) and the distractor 
stimulus appeared in the left visual field (LVF) or the right visual 
field (RVF). Each stimulus was black on a white circular field. The 
circular field subtended a visual angle of 4 deg whi Ie the stimulus 
itself subtended a visual angle of 2 deg. The angle of separation 
between the standard stimuli and distractor was 4 deg 21 min. 
A set of verbal stimuli was also used to examine possible 
effects of stimulus type on process latera 1 ization . The verbal 
stimuli developed by Taylor ( 1976a) in a study of non-1 atera1ized 
analytic and holistic processes (see Figure 1) were used in the 
present study. Taylor used the letters A, E, 0, F, H, and U as 
1 
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Figure I. T.iy Lor' s Verbal Stimuli. 
The letters shown are twice their actual size. 
(Taylor, 19 76) 
standard or criterion stimuli. By varying the number of line segments 
composing these letters, Taylor created distractor stimuli that 
differed from the standard stimuli on one, two, or three line 
segments. All the distractor stimuli for each standard were one of 
the other five standard stimuli. 
In the present study, each of Taylor's (1976a) six standard 
stimuli appeared in the CVK and eacli of the three distractor stimuli 
appeared in the LVF, and the RVF. The angle of separation between 
the standard and distractor stimuli was 4 deg 21 min. The letters 
were presented in black on a white circular field. The circular 
field subtended a visual angle of 55.80 min and each letter was 37.20 
X 22.20 min in size. The thickness of the line segments composing 
eacli letter was 6.6 min. 
All the nonsense shape stimuli were constructed using ordinary 
black and white construction paper. The letter stimuli were drawn 
into the circular field using Higgins black India ink and a Speedball 
C-2 caligraphy pen. All stimuli were presented by means of an Iconix 
three-channel tachistoscope. An electronic timer, coupled to the 
tachistoscope, measured RT in msec and controlled presentations of 
the stimuli. The luminance level of all the white circular fields 
2 
was kept at 68.5 cd/m . 
Procedu re 
The total experiment was divided into three sessions. The first 
was the same for all subjects. It was for the purpose of classifying 
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subjects as Type I or Type II. Subjects were greeted by tbe 
experimenter and seated in front of the tachistocope. They were then 
asked to sign a Letter of consent (see Appendix B) and given written 
instructions (see Appendix C). Any questions concerning their task, 
but not the explicit nature of the study, were then answered. 
Using the reduced number of Cooper's (1976) nonsense shape 
stimuli, the subjects were first presented with a central fixation 
point in the CVF for 2000 msec followed by a standard stimulus in one 
of three orientations for 3000 msec. Immediately following the 
offset of the standard stimulus an inter-stimu1 us-interva1 of 100 
msec began, after which a distractor stimulus was presented in the 
same orientation as the standard. The subjects were required to 
indicate whether the two stimuli were the same by saying "same" or 
"different" into a microphone connected to a voice activated relay 
which was coupled to the timer. Reaction time was measured from the 
onset of the distractor stimulus until a "same" or "different" 
response was made. 
Subjects were provided with verbal feedback concerning the 
accuracy of their judgements. Error trials were recorded and were 
presented again, randomly interspersed with the remaining trials. 
Subjects were told that for each trial the probabilities of the 
distractor stimulus being the same as or different from the standard 
were equal. This was true of all trials in each of the three 
sessions. Prior to the experimental session proper each subject 
participated in 13 randomly selected practice trials. There were 10 
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comparisons per standard in each orientation, 5 same and 5 different. 
Thus 30 comparisons per orientation or 90 comparisons total, plus any 
error trials, were made per subject. The experimenter was blind as 
to the results of this initial classification session until after all 
three sessions were completed. 
The second and third sessions were for the purpose of examininR 
1 atera1ization effects. Half of the subjects received the second set 
of lateralized nonsense shapes and written instructions (see Appendix 
D) in the second session and the verbal letter stimuli and 
instructions (see Appendix E) in the third session. The other half 
received the opposite sequence. 
Presentation of the lateralized nonsense shapes was similar to 
that of the previously shown non-lateraIized nonsense shapes. 
However visual field as a variable was substituted for the 
orientation variable, with distractor stimuli appearing in the LVF 
and RVF an equal number of times. The standard stimuli appeared only 
in the CVF. There was a 2000 msec presentation of a central fixation 
point. Each standard stimuli then appeared for 500 msec. Then there 
was a 1000 msec inter-stimulus-interval which was followed by a 100 
msec presentation of a distractor stimulus. Each subject was given 
13 randomly selected practice trials before the experimental session 
proper. There were 10 comparisons per standard in each visual field, 
5 same and 5 different. Thus 30 comparisons per visual field or 60 
comparisons total, plus any error trials, were made per subject. 
Present.-? t ion of the la tera 1 ized , letter stimuli was the same as 
that of the lateralized nonsense shapes. Hie number of practice 
trials, stimulus duration, and inter-stimulus-interval was also the 
same. There were 18 comparisons per standard, 9 same and 9 
different, and 36 comparisons per visual field, per subject. A total 
of 72 comparisons, plus any error trials, were made per subject. 
The response mode was a manual key-press for both 1 atera 1ization 
sessions. Since Berlucchi, Heron, Hyman, & Kizzolatti (1971) have 
demonstrated that responding with the hand ipsilateral to the 
stimulus is significantly faster than responding witii the hand 
contralatera 1 to the stimulus, half of the subjects responded 
"different" with their right index finger by tapping a key which was 
positioned to the right of the subject's midline, and "same" by 
tapping their left index finger on a key positioned to the subject's 
left. The other half had the opposite arrangement. This procedure 
should have also controlled for any response advantage that the right 
hand may have had due to the left or verbal hemisphere having direct 
access to RVF stimuli (and hence faster RT) if a verbal response were 
used. When not responding, subjects were asked to maintain their 
index fingers on two non-functioning keys located between the two 
responding keys. 
Resul ts 
Using the data from the initial classification session, the 
subjects were first classified as Type I or Type II according to 
iu 
Cooper s (1976) criteria. because each overall "same" vs. overall 
ditferent 1 KT comparison was based on 45 data points per mean, it 
was felt that this comparison would be the most reliable in terms of 
the variance within each group of RTs. Those subjects whose overall 
mean "same" RT was slower than their overall mean "different" RT were 
tentatively classified as Type If. Those subjects whose overall mean 
"same" Rf was faster than their overall mean "different" RT were 
tentatively classified as Type I. Cach subject's "different" Rf data 
was then examined to determine if there was a tendency for RT to 
decrease as the distractor stimuli became increasingly dissimilar to 
the standard. This criterion was thought to be the least reliable 
since only nine data points per distractor were used to compare with 
the 45 data points per standard, hence one would expect more 
variability within each distractor score. Those Type II subjects 
whose "different" Rfs tended to decrease with increasing distractor 
dissimilarity remained classed as Type II. Some Type II subjects, 
however, failed to show decreasing RT with increasing distractor 
dissimilarity. These subjects were classified as Type IIA (Simmons, 
1982). For those subjects tentatively classified as Type I, some 
demonstrated decreasing RT with increasing distractor dissimilarity. 
These subjects were also classed as Type IIA. 'Hie remaining 
subjects, those whose mean "same" RT was faster than their mean 
"ditferent" RT and whose mean distractor RTs did not tend to 
decrease, were classed as Type I. Ihese classification criteria 
resulted in 22 subjects being classed as Type II, 6 as Type IIA, and 
only 2 as Type I (see Figure 2 and Appendix F). 

Originally die KT data for both the Type I subjects and the Type 
II subjects were to be subjected to a 2 x 2 x 2 within subjects AK'OVA 
to examine I atera1ization effects. However two subjects dropped from 
the experiment after the initial classification session. One subject 
was classed as Type I and the other was Type II. This left an n^ of 
28 for the two latera 1 ization sessions. With only one of the two 
Type I subjects having latera1ization data, analysis of this 
subject's data would be meaningless. It was decided that data 
analysis of the KT scores from the two lateraIization sessions would 
consist of various combinations of the subject subgroups. Separate 
ANOVAs were done using, (1) the KT data for the Type I, Type II, and 
Type IIA groups combined, (2) the RT data of only the Type II group, 
and (3) the RT data of only the Type IIA group. The factors used for 
all the ANOVAs were stimulus type (letters vs. nonsense shapes), 
visual field (left vs. right), and match (same vs. different). 
An ANOVA of all the subjects combined (see Table 1 and Table 2) 
yielded a significant main effect of Stimulus Type F(l,27) = 6.19, 
.03. The mean RT time for the letter stimuli was 666.77 msec and for 
the nonsense shapes it was 714.91 msec, a difference of 48.14 msec. 
There were two significant interaction effects, Stimulus Type X 
Visual Field, Kl,27 ) = 7 .09, p< .01, and Stimulus Type X Match, 
F( 1 ,2 7 ) = 15 .87, P< .001. Analysis of the simple main effects of 
Visual Field in the Stimulus Type X Visual Field interaction revealed 
that the nonsense shape stimuli were processed 22.62 msec faster when 
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Table 1 
Source Fable For The Stimulus Type X Visual Field X Match ANOVA 
of the Type I, Type II, and Type IIA Subjects Combined RT Data 
Sour ce SS df MS 
Stimulus Type 129784.96 
Stimulus Type X Subjects 565727.97 
Visual Field 3843.66 
Visual Field X Subjects 57803.55 
Match 3979.55 
Match X Subjects 87573.91 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 11506.27 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 43833.34 
X Subjects 
Visual Field X Match 711.96 
Visual Field X Match 51349.58 
X Subjects 
Stimulus Type X Match 43733.65 
Stimulus Type X Match 74400.93 
X Subjects 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 38.38 
X Match 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 45905.14 
X Match X Subjects 
27 
27 
1 
27 
27 
1 
27 
1 
27 
1 
27 
129784 .96 
20952.89 
3843.66 
2140.87 
3979.55 
3243.48 
1 1 506.27 
1623.46 
71 I .96 
1901 .84 
43733.65 
2755.59 
38.37 
1700.19 
6.19* 
1 .80 
1 .23 
7.09** 
.37 
15.87*** 
.02 
Tota 1 1151898 .40 196 
*p< .05 
**p< .01 
***p< .001 
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Table 2 
Mean KIs for bach Term in the Stimulus Type X Visual Field X Match ANOVA 
for The Type I, Type II, and Type IIA Subjects Combined 
Verba1 
Non-Ver ba1 
666.77 
714.91 
LVK 
RVK 
686.70 
694.98 
Same 
Di f ferent 
686.63 
695.06 
Ve r ba1 Non-Ve r ba1 
LVF 
RVF 
669.80 
663.75 
703.60 
726.22 
Verbal Non-Verba1 
Same 
Di f ferent 
648.58 
684.96 
724 .67 
705.15 
LVF RVF 
Same 
Di f ferent 
684.27 
689.13 
688.99 
700.98 
LVF LVF RVF RVF 
Ver ba1 Non-Ve rba1 Verba1 Non-Verba1 
Same 
Different 
653.81 
685 .79 
714.73 
692.47 
643.36 
684 .1 3 
734.61 
717.83 
Note. All values are in msec 
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they were presented in the RVF (703.60 and 726.22 msec, 
respectively). There was no difference in RT between visual field of 
presentation for the letter stimuli (669.63, and 663.73 msec for the 
LVF and RVF respectively), although the absolute differences were in 
the expected direction. Analysis of the simple main effects of Match 
in the Stimulus Type X Match interaction revealed that RT difterences 
between the two stimulus types depended upon the type of response 
being made. Mean "same" RT to the letter stimuli was 36.38 msec 
faster than mean "different" RT (648.58 and 684.96 msec, 
respectively), _F(l,27) = 11.57, .01. While mean "same" RT to the 
nonsense shapes was 19.52 msec slower than the mean "different" RT 
(724.67 and 705.15 msec respectively), this term approached but did 
not quite reach significance, _F(1,27) = 3.81, jj= .06. 
A second ANOVA was performed using only the data from the Type 
II subjects (see Table 3 and Table 4). The Stimulus Type main effect 
approached but did not reach significance, _F(1,20) = 4.09, £> .056, 
(668.48 and 718.92 msec for the letters and nonsense shapes, 
respectively). There was also a significant interaction between 
Stimulus Type and Match, _F(l,20) = 9.12, £< .01. Mean "same" RT for 
the letter stimuli was 657.03 msec and mean "different" RT was 
679.94. Mean "same" RT for the nonsense shapes was 730.65 msec and 
mean "different" RT was 707.20. 
A third ANOVA was performed using the RT data from only the Type 
11A subjects (see Table 5 and Table 6). The Stimulus Type X Visual 
Field interaction was significant, _F (1,5) = 9.85, £< .05. Mean RT 
Ta b I e i 
Source Table For The Stimulus Type 
X Visual Field X March ANOVA of the Type II Subjects RT Data 
Source SS df MS 
Stimulus Type 106361.18 
Stimulus Type X Subjects 521364.48 
Visual Field 3909.22 
Visual Field X Subjects 35835.95 
Match 3.03 
Match X Subjects 58659.40 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 2724.12 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 27473.49 
X Subjects 
Visual Field X Match 969.66 
Visual Field X Match 37216.08 
X Subjects 
Stimulus Type X Match 22555.99 
Stimulus Type X Matcli 49472 .85 
X S ub j e c t s 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 2287.86 
X Match 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 80475.96 
X Match X Subjects 
1 
20 
20 
20 
20 
1 
20 
20 
20 
106861.18 
26068.22 
3909.22 
1791.80 
3.0 3 
2932 .96 
2724 . 1 2 
1373.67 
969 .66 
1860.80 
22555 .99 
24 7 3 . 64 
2287 .86 
4023.80 
4.09 
2. 18 
.001 
.98 
.52 
9.12** 
.56 
Tot a 1 949809.27 147 
**p< .01 
Table A 
Mean K'ls for Kach I'crni in the Stiniulus 'Type 
X Visual Field X Match ANOVA for the Type II Subjects 
Verbal 
Non-Ver ba1 
LVF 
RVF 
Same 
DifterenL 
LVF 
RVF 
Same 
Dit ferent 
Same 
Di f ferent 
Same 
Different 
668.48 
718.92 
688.88 
698.53 
693.83 
69 3 .5 7 
Verba1 
667.69 
669.28 
Verba1 
657.03 
679.94 
LVF 
691 .63 
686.13 
LVF 
Ve r ba1 
656 . 35 
679.02 
Non-Ve rba1 
710.07 
72 7 . 77 
Non-Verba1 
730.65 
707.21 
KVF 
696.05 
701.70 
LVF 
Non-Verba1 
726.91 
693.24 
RVF 
Ve r ba1 
65 7 . 71 
680.85 
RVF 
Non-Ve rba1 
734.38 
721 .16 
Note. All values are in msec. 
Table 5 
Source table For The Stimulus Type 
X Visual Field X Match ANOVA of the Type IIA Subjects RT Data 
38 
Source SS df MS 
Stimulus Type 11994.73 
Stimulus Type X Subjects 35691.53 
V i s ua 1 Fi e 1 d ()91 . 30 
Visual Field X Subjects 20687.97 
Match 8395.80 
Match X Subjects 10724.74 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 16560.73 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 8406.90 
X Subjects 
Visua I Fie 1d X Match 82.42 
Visual Field X Match 12914.71 
X Subjects 
Stimulus Type X Match 25344.18 
Stimulus Type X Matcli 19955 . 34 
X Subjects 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 3488.43 
X Match 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 4969.21 
X Match X Subjects 
11994.73 
7138. 31 
691.30 
41 37.59 
8395.80 
2144.95 
16560.73 
1681 .37 
82 .42 
2582.94 
25 344 . 13 
3991 .07 
3488.43 
993.84 
.68 
.17. 
3.91 
9.85* 
.03 
6. 35 
3.51 
Tot a 1 179907.99 42 
*p< .05 
Ta b 1 e 6 
Mean Kls lor l-'.jch 'l£:rin in tht; Stimulus Type 
X Visual Field X Match ANOVA for the Type I[A Subjects 
Ver ba1 
Non-Verba1 
672.60 
704.22 
LVF 
RVF 
684.62 
692.21 
Same 
Oilfe r e n t 
675 .19 
701.64 
LVF 
KVF 
Verbal 
68 7 . 38 
657.82 
Non-Verba1 
681.85 
726.59 
Same 
Different 
Verba1 
636.40 
708.81 
Non-Ve r ba1 
713.97 
694 .47 
Same 
Different 
LVF 
6 70 .08 
699.15 
RVF 
680.29 
704 . 1 2 
Same 
Di fferent 
LVF 
Verba1 
65 8. 39 
716.37 
LVF 
Non-Verba1 
681 .77 
681 .93 
RVF 
Verba1 
614.40 
701.24 
RVF 
Non-Ver ba1 
746.18 
70 7 .00 
Note. All values are in msec. 
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for the letters appearing in the LVF was 687.38 while letters 
appearing in the RVK had a mean KT of 637.82. Mean RT for the 
nonsense shapes appearing in the LVF was 681.83, while shapes 
appearing in the RVF had a mean Rf of 726.59. These simple main 
eftects, though not significant, are in the expected direction. The 
Stimulus Type X Match Interaction was also significant, F(l,5) = 
6.35, .05. Mean RT "same" and "different" for the letter stimuli 
was 636.40 msec and 708.81 msec. Mean RT "same" and "different" for 
the nonsense shapes was 713.91 msec and 694.47 msec. 
Chi-square analyses were performed on the error rate data from 
the classification session. There were significantly more errors 
2 
made on "sane" trials than on "different" trials, X (1, N = 351) = 
7.42, p< .01. The five distractor stimuli also differed 
2 
significantly in their distribution of errors, X (1, N = 351) = 
234.99, p< .01, with the number of errors increasing as the 
distractors increased in similarity to the standard. 
Additional- chi-square analyses were performed on the two types 
of stimuli to determine if the distribution of error rates differed 
with respect to visual field. There was no significant difference in 
2 
error rates across both visual fields for the letters, X (1, N = 67) 
2 
= .37, p> .05, and for the shapes, X (1, _N = 1 37) = 3.52 , p> .05. 
Discussion 
Most notable among the results of the initial, classification 
session is that only 2, or 7%, of the 30 subjects were classed as 
Type I. Both Cooper (1976; Cooper & Podgorney, 1976) and Simmons 
(1982) reported the proportion of Type I subjects and Type II 
subjects as being about .30 and .70 respectively (including the Type 
I1A subjects in Simmons study as Type II). A chi-square analysis of 
the frequency of Type I and Type II subjects in the present study, 
based on Cooper's and Simmons' classification data, reveals that the 
incidence of Type 1 and Type II subjects in the present study differs 
2 
significantly from the expected frequency, X (l,_N=30) = 6.635 , £< 
.01 . 
A total of six subjects in the present study could not be 
clearly classified as Type I or Type II. They most nearly resembled 
the Type II subjects so they were labeled Type IIA. Cooper (1976; 
Cooper & Podgorney, 1976) did not find these subjects in her 
experiments. Simmons (1982), using a reduced number of Cooper's 
stimuli reported 9 out of 30 subjects as being Type IIA. 
Rather than suggesting the existence of a third class of 
subjects, the occurrence of the Type IIA subjects in Simmons' and the 
present study are probably the result of using a reduced number of 
standard and distractor stimuli from that used by Cooper (1976). 
Cooper used a total of five standard stimuli and seven distractor 
stimuli per standard. This standard/distractor combination resulted 
in a total of 420 comparisons per subjects, significant 1v more than 
the 90 comparisons used in the present study. Specifically, each 
same" mean Rf score per subject in Cooper's study was based on 210 
comparisons, whereas each "same" mean RT score per subject in the 
present study was based on only 45 comparisons. Each of the seven 
mean distractor RT scores in Cooper's study was based on 30 
individual comparisons, whereas in the present study, only nine 
comparisons determined each mean distractor Rf. Since so few raw 
data points determined each mean distractor RT in the present study, 
any given mean distractor RT was more readily influenced by extreme 
score values. Hence a random occurrence of a few extreme raw data 
points probably contributed in affecting the "actual" mean value for 
some of the distractor or standard stimuli, if indeed these subjects 
are actually Type II, and may have resulted in a misc1 assification. 
It is also interesting to note that, while more errors were made 
in "same" responses in the present study, this finding is the exact 
opposite of that found by Cooper (1976). However in both studies 
errors tended to decrease as the distractor stimulus decreased in 
similarity to the standard. 
The comparatively low incidence of Type I subjects in the 
present study may be explained as simply a sampling problem. That 
is, by chance only 2 of the 30 subjects in the present study may have 
actually been of the Type I variety. 
4.} 
Alternatively, some type of subject selection bias may have been 
operatinj' to produce so few Type I subjects. Cooper (1976; Cooper & 
Fodgorny , 19 76) reports that, of a total of 26 subjects in J 
experiments, 11 were female and 1 male was left-handed. Simmons 
(1982) reports that 13 of a total of 30 right-handed subjects were 
female. Neither study controlled for familial handedness. Since 
gender, handedness, and fami1ia1-handedness have previously been 
identified as factors affecting cognitive performance, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that these variables may have interacted with 
the subject's available cognitive resources in both Cooper's and 
Simmons' studies to produce the subject classifications they 
observed . 
The criteria for subject selection used in the present study 
were more stringent than those used in Cooper's and Simmons' studies. 
To participate in the present study an individual had to be male, 
right-handed, and have no immediate familial history of 
1eft-handedness. Additionally, all of the the subjects in the 
present study were grossly screened for visual acuity. These 
criteria probably insured a more homogeneous subject sample than the 
subject samples used in the previously cited studies. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that those factors influencing subject 
heterogeneity (i.e. including females, left-handed males or males 
with a familial history of Ieft-handedness ) may have been the same 
ones operating to produce the Type I subjects in Cooper s and 
Simmons' studies. At any rate, the central thesis of the present 
study, examining the effects of subject tvpe on the latera 1 ization of 
cognitive processes, could not be adequately tested since so few Type 
I subjects were observed. 
Analysis of the lateraIization sessions KT data produced rather 
interesting results. The letter stimuli were consistently processed 
faster than the nonsense shapes. Bindra, Donderi, and Nishisato 
(1968) have suggested that quicker "sane" responses are produced by 
easily codable stimuli. Since letters are probably the most 
meaningful, overlearned, and easily codable stimuli, the faster RT to 
the letters observed in the present study is not surprising. 
Analysis of the significant Stimulus Type X Match interactions 
reveals that, while the letter stimuli did produce faster "sane" 
responses than "different" responses, the nonsense shapes produced 
faster "different" responses than "same" responses. Assuming the 
most efficient processor is operative for any given combination of 
task demand and cognitive resource composition, the faster KTs for 
"different" responses for the nonsense shapes preclude the operation 
of an analytical, feature-by-feature comparison process. This 
finding is also evident from the overall "same" vs overall 
"different" classification data of the Type IT subjects, and three of 
the Type IIA subjects given in Appendix F. 
Also of note is the lark of a significant Match main effect in 
any of trie analyses. Since both types of stimuli were always 
included in the same analysis, the consistently significant Stimulus 
Type X Match interaction may explain the lack of a significant Match 
'4 = 
main effect. The faster "same" response to Letter stimuli and the 
faster "different" response to the nonsense shapes probably offset 
each other to produce a negligible difference between "same" and 
"different" responses. 
Analyses of the RT data from the two latera1ization sessions 
only partially suggest processing differences between the two 
cerebral hemispheres. An examination of the data from all the 
subjects combined did yield a significant interaction between 
Stimulus Type and Visual Field, but this interaction was significant 
only because RT to the nonsense shapes was faster when the shapes 
appeared in the LVF, and hence had direct access to the right, or 
visuo-spatia1 hemisphere. This finding is in agreement with much of 
the hemispheric specialization literature (Bradshaw & Nettleton, 
1981; Dimond & Beaumont, 1974). 
However, there was no difference in RT scores between the LVF 
and the RVF for the letters. If the LH does have a processing 
advantage for verbal material, then the RT to letter stimuli 
appearing in the RVF should have been faster than the RT for letter 
stimuli in the LVF. In the Bagnara et al. (1982) study, there was a 
significant LVF advantage using the same letters that were used in 
the present study. As an explanation of their observation of 
opposite than expected lateralization effects, Bagnara et al. suggest 
that "letters yield a RVF advantage only when comparisons are based 
on their phonetic code"; comparisons based on the physical structure 
of the letters yield mixed results. Some researchers find a LVF 
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advantnge (Cohen, 1972; Geffen, Bradshaw, and Nettleton, 1972), some 
find a RVK advantage (filgeth and Cpstein, 1972), and still some find 
no visual field advantage (Simion et al., 1980, exp. 4). Since the 
letters used in the Bagnara et al. study and in the present study 
systematically varied in their degree of physical similarity (Taylor, 
1976), then perhaps some of the subjects in the these studies 
compared the letters based on their physical identity, rather than 
their name identity. An admixture of subjects who made letter 
comparisons based on name identity witli subjects who made comparisons 
based on physical identity would introduce error variance into the 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field interaction. It is not unreasonable to 
conclude that the introduction of too many of these subjects would 
yield a non-significant interaction between the letter stimuli and 
visual field. 
It was hypothesized that for the Type II subjects there would be 
a significant Visual Field X Match interaction having tiie form ot RT 
"same" being faster in the LVF and RT "different" being faster in the 
RVF. To the contrary this interaction was quite non-significant in 
every analysis in the present study. There is no evidence that 
visual field had any effect upon the type of response made. It is 
difficult to explain the lack of evidence for the 1 atera1ization of 
analytic and holistic processes to the LH and RH respectively, 
assuming that these processing capabilities exist independently 
within their respective hemispheres. Certainly, the type of subjects 
used could not be a source of confounding. The subjects composing 
U1 
tlie present ex|)eriinent have previously been identified as beiriK the 
most homogeneous with respect to hemispheric specialization. 
Similarly, botli types of stimuli were specifically constructed for 
the identification ot analytic and holistic processes and they have 
been successful at doing so with non-latera1ized stimulus 
presentations (Cooper, 197b; Taylor, 1976). 
The lack of a significant Visual Field X Match interaction is 
identical with the results found by Bagnara et al (1982). Bagnara et 
al. did find that RT decreased as the number of segments forming the 
distractor letter increased. In addition "same" responses were 
significantly faster that "different" responses. Thus, they conclude 
that, "if the Taylor paradigm is accepted as implicating analytic and 
holistic processes in visual comparison, it would appear that the 
hemispheres are not differentiated in that respect: botli can process 
visual information analytically and ho Iistica1 Iy". 
In sum, five observations can be gleaned from the data analysis 
presented above: (1) Significantly more subjects were classed as 
Type II (including the Type IIAs) than was expected. This may have 
been due to an inadvertent subject selection bias which excluded Type 
I subjects. (2) RT to letter stimuli was significantly faster than 
RT to nonsense shapes. Certainly we can presume that the letter 
stimuli were more meaningful and easily codable than the nonsense 
shapes, hence they should have been processed faster. (3) Making a 
"same" response to letter stimuli is faster than making a "different" 
response, while making a "same" response to nonsense shapes is slower 
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than making a "different" response. 'Hie interaction between Stimuliis 
Type and Match supports the notion of faster "sane" responses to 
easily codable stimuli. (4) RT to nonsense shapes v/as faster than RT 
to the letter stimuli when the shapes were presented in the LVF, 
while no visual field differences were observed for the letters. 
Possibly different hemispheric resource strategies were used by some 
subjects to compare the letters. (5) No evidence of 
analytic/hoIistic latera1ization effects was found. This was perhaps 
the most significant finding, however it is not without precedent 
(bagnara et al., 1982). 
It is suggested that since both types of stimuli were 
constructed such that each distractor varied systematically from it's 
standard, both types of stimuli could have been readily processed 
based on their physical identity. In other words, there would be a 
significant effect of the type of distractor on RT. Distractors 
least dissimilar to their respective standards should have longer RTs 
titan distractors most dissimilar. This hypothesis is not readily 
tested from the analysis presented above, therefore another analysis 
was done using only the distractor data. The data were subjected to 
a 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA to assess the effects of distractor type upon RT. 
The factors used were Type of Stimulus (verbal vs non-verbal), Visual 
Field (left vs right), and Type of Distractor (leasl dissimilar vs 
most dissimilar). 
Results of this analysis are presented in Table 7 and Table 8. 
there was a significant main eflect of Type of Distractor, _F( I , 2 7) = 
Ta b1e 7 
Source lablt; For The Stimulus ly|>t} X Visual Field X Distractor Tvpe 
ANOVA of the Type 1, Type II, and Type IIA Subjects RT Distractor Data 
'4 9 
Source SS df MS 
Stimulus Type 23847.15 
Stimulus Type X Subjects 551432.2b 
Visual Field 17021.66 
Visual Field X Subjects 132472.56 
Distractor Type 364229.54 
Distractor Type X Subjects 199594.77 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 8036.55 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 85389.40 
X Subjects 
Visual Field X Distractor Type 743.94 
Visual Field X Distractor Type 69525.82 
X S ub j e c t s 
Stimulus Type X Distractor Type 19297.35 
Stimulus Type X Di s t r n c t Type 1 1 8791 .94 
X Subjects 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 8397.08 
X Distractor Type 
Stimulus Type X Visual Field 183461.84 
X Distractor Type X Subjects 
27 
1 
27 
1 
27 
27 
1 
27 
1 
27 
I 
27 
23947.35 
20423.42 
1 70 21 .66 
4906.39 
364229.53 
7392 .03 
8036.55 
3! 62 .57 
74 3 . 94 
25 75 .03 
19297 . 35 
4399 . 70 
8387 .08 
6794 .88 
1.17 
3.47 
49.27*** 
2.54 
,29 
4. 39* 
,23 
Tota 1 1151898.40 196 
*£< .05 
***£< .001 
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Ta b 1 e 8 
Mean RT-s of Each Term in the Stimulus type X Visual Field X Uistractor 
Type ANOVA for the Type 1, Type II, and Type TIA Subjects 
Combined Distractor Data 
Ver baI 
Non-Ver ba L 
69 3.65 
714.28 
LVF 
RVF 
694.24 
713.54 
Least Diss 
Most Diss. 
74 3.07 
664.68 
LVF 
RVF 
Verba1 
690 .12 
697.23 
Non-Verbal 
698.44 
729.85 
Verba1 Non-Verba1 
Least Diss, 
Most Diss. 
723.18 
663.59 
763.68 
665 .77 
LVF RVF 
Least Diss, 
Most Diss. 
Least Diss, 
Most Diss. 
734.96 
65 3 .45 
LVF 
Verba1 
726.79 
652.14 
751 .1 7 
675.91 
LVF 
Non-Verba1 
74 3 . 74 
654 .75 
RVF 
Ve r baI 
719 .43 
675.03 
RVF 
Non-VerbaI 
782.94 
676.79 
Note. All values are in msec. 
49.27, £< .OOl. The least dissimilar distractor RTs were 78.19 msec 
slower than the the most dissimilar distractor RTs (741.05 and hh4.68 
msec respectively). There was also a significant interaction between 
Stimulus Type and Type of Distractor, F(l,27) = 4.39, p< .05. 
Analysis of the simple main effects of type of distractor reveals 
that thert" was a significant effect of stimulus type upon the least 
dissimilar distractor RT data. For the least dissimilar distractor 
Rfs, the verbal stimuli were processed 40.5 msec faster than the than 
the shapes (723.18 and 763.68 msec respectively). This term 
approached but did not quite reach significance, F(l,27) = 3.5, p= 
.07. For the most dissimilar distractor RTs, the difference between 
the verbal and non-verbal stimuli were negligible (663.59 and 665.77 
msec respectively). No interaction with visual field as a term was 
si gn i f i ca nt . 
The results of this analvsis indicate that standard/distractor 
comparisons for both types of stimuli were made on the physical 
characteristics of the stimuli. Reaction time decreased with 
increasing distractor dissimilarity, which also denotes the operation 
of an analytic type of processor. Also, when a difficult 
standard/distractor comparison is being made (as in the case of the 
least dissimilar distractor RTs), RT is shorter with the more readily 
codable letter stimuli than with the shapes. Easily made 
discriminations yield no such stimulus type .advantage. 
In general, all of the discriminative RT analyses presented 
above suggest that both verbal and non-verbal stimuli can be 
52 
processed with an analytic or feature-hy-1 enture comparison based on 
the physical identity ot the stiiiinli. There is no evidence that 
either hemisphere has an advantage along this process dimension. 
I here is also no evidence for the notion of a holistic processor, 
lateralized or not, since the recognized criterion for this 
processor, "same" responses being significantly faster than 
"different" responses, failed to materialize in the present 
ex pe r iment . 
Further research is needed along an individual difference 
dimension in cognitive resources in general, and specialization of 
hemispheric function in particular. In particular, future research 
is needed to explore the relationship, if any, between previous Iv 
recognized factors that affect cognitive performance (i.e. handedness 
and gender), and the Type I/Type TI classification scheme. For 
example, subjects could be grouped according to gender, subject 
handedness, and familial handedness, and the relationship between 
their grouping and Type I/Type II classification could be examined. 
Future research is also needed to determine the reliability of the 
Type I/Type II classification scheme. If the Type I/Type II 
classifications are merely transient, then the low incidence of Type 
I subjects in the present study becomes moot. 
It is also suggested that instead of trying to identify 
simplistic, dichotomous entities that are presummed to reside within 
the two cerebral hemispheres, research is needed to identify the 
significant parameters that result in differential performance levels 
5 3 
within and between subjects on a given task. liertelson (1982) has 
suggested that the analytic/holistic classification scheme in 
particular is inherently fraught with limitations: 
Ihe analytic/holistic distinction is however a vague one. 
hike most terms borrowed from everyday language, it carries 
a number of different meanings. This is not a reason to 
prohibit such importations, but the danger exists that 
terms of that kind be taken more seriously than they 
deserve, leading to unwarranted generalizations from some 
of their meanings to others. . . If one tries to translate 
the holistic/analytic dichotomy into more operational 
terms, which would allow testable predictions, one finds 
that it is compatible with several not necessarily 
equivalent translations such as focal attention vs. 
pre-attentive segmentation of the sensory field, attention 
to local detail rather than overall configuration, 
serial classification vs. parallel testing of several 
features (or template matching), attention to high 
frequency vs. low frequency Fourier components. . . many 
explanatory successes of the ana lytic/uoIistic dichotomy 
are actually post-hoc. Marshall (1981) took the example of 
the task consisting of choosing among several circles 
the one of which a particular arc is a part, and which work 
with split-brain patients has shown to be better 
accomplished by the isolated KM (Nebes, 1974). Brudshnw 
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and Nettfilton (1981) describe the task as involving 
"the ability to to nn a complete Gestalt (e.". a circle) 
from incomplete intormation (e.g. arcs of a circle)". 
Ami Marshall comments: "Had tiie data gone the other wav, 
we can be sure that the task would have been described 
as implicating the ability to decotnpose circles into 
their constitute arcs (an analytic operation). . . ". 
(p. 197-198). 
The disdain which is reflected by Bertelson (1982) exists in 
part because of a lack of consensus in operationally defining 
analytic and holistic processes. Although the present study does not 
directly address this problem (and indeed, may contribute to it), it 
is clear that some consistency in definition is needed if the 
"analytic/holistic" dichotomy is to yield further, meaningful 
resea rch . 
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Appendix A 
Harris Questionnaire 
In order to participate in the study you must complete this 
questionnaire. Please answer the questions below as best as you can. 
Please do not leave any questions blank. If you do not answer every 
question, there is a good chance that you will not participate, hence you 
will receive no money. 
Narne: Landrum Box#: Phone #: 
With which hand do you. . . Left Right 
1. Throw a BalI 
2. Wind a Watch 
3. Hammer a Nail 
4. Brush Teeth 
5. Com b Hai r 
6. Turn Door Knob 
7. Hoid Eraser 
8. Use Scissors 
9. Cut with Knife 
10. Wri te 
Answer the following questions Yes, No, or DNA (Does Not Apply). 
1. Is your father predominantly 
2. Is your mother predominantly 
3. If you have any sisters, are 
predominantly right-handed. 
4. If you have any brothers, are 
predominantly right-handed. 
right-handed. Yes No DNA 
right-handed. Yes No DNA 
all of them 
Yes No DNA 
all of them 
Yes No DNA 
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Appendix B 
Con sent Form 
1 understand that participation in this study is voluntary and 
that 1 will be exposed to no bodily or psychological stress. 1 will 
be required to make perceptual judgements on visual stimuli over a 
period of three sessions, and the data will be used as part of a 
masters thesis. The data will be held in confidentiality and will in 
no way affect my grade in any class, except for the addition of the 
extra-credit points. I may withdraw participation at any time. 1 
further understand that if I do withdraw participation before the end 
of the 3rd session I will receive no money points for any prior 
pa rt i c i pa t i on . 
Name: 
Date: 
ID#: 
Appendix C 
Instructions for First Session 
This is the first of three sessions. These are the instructions 
for tli is session. On the machine in front of you, there is a place 
for you to look into. At first you will see a center cross. This is 
called the "fixation point". Look at this point; do not remove your 
eyes from it. Immediately following this point, you will see a 
geometric shape. Notice this shape; do not remove your eyes from it 
as it will be visible for only a short time. Immediately following 
this shape you will see another one. Your task at this point, is 
simply to make a decision as to whether the two shapes that you saw 
were the same or different shapes. If you think that they were the 
same, say "same" into the microphone below the viewer. If you think 
that they were different, say "different" into the microphone. Make 
your decisions as fast and as accurate as possible. This will 
constitute a "trial". 
After you finish this trial the machine will be reset, and a new 
trial will begin with another fixation point. You will then see two 
new shapes, and you will decide whether these two are the same or 
different . 
Keep the following points in mind. Always look at the direct 
center of the screen, in other words, on the fixation point. This is 
to make it easier for you to view the shapes. Also, on any given 
trial the probability that the two shapes are actually the same or 
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di E fereut is equal. There will be an equal number of same and 
different trials so try not to guess. 
We will run through a few practice trials at first. Are there 
any questions? 
Appendix D 
Instructions for Second Session 
During tliis session, you will again be presented with several 
trials of two stimuli, and you will be asked to make "same-different" 
judgements on tliese stimuli. However a few things will be different 
from the first session. This time, instead of saying "same" or 
"different" into a microphone you will respond by tapping your 
fingers on a mechanical key. If you think that the two stimuli were 
different, press the outermost left key with your left index finger. 
If you think that they were the same, press the outer-most right key 
with your right index finger. At all times when you are not 
responding keep your fingers positioned on the two innermost keys. 
This will let me know that you are ready to begin another trial. 
Also, sometimes the second stimulus that you see will be either 
to the left or right of the first stimulus. Since the chances that 
the second stimulus will appear in any one of these positions are 
equal, keep your eyes fixated at the center. This will give you the 
best chance of making a fast, accurate response. We will start with 
a few practice trials. 
Are there any questions? 
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Appendix £ 
InsLruetions for Third Session 
This is the third and final session. This session will be 
exactly like the second. If you think that the two stimuli are 
different, then press the outermost left key with you left index 
finger. If you think that the two stimuli were the same, press the 
outermost right key with your right index finger. At all other times 
keep your fingers placed on the two innermost keys. 
like in the second session, the second stimulus will appear 
randomly either to the left or to the right. Keep your eyes fixated 
on the center to maximize your decision making. There will be a few 
practice trials before we begin. 
Are there any questions? 
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Appendix F 
Subject Dat.i from the Classification Session* 
Subject 
Type I 
JL 
CD 
Same Different 
RT RT D1 
D i s t rac tor St i mu1i 
Most Similar to Least Similar 
D2 D3 
801.29 
775.51 
843.47 
788.73 
628.87 
744.00 
758.55 
832.66 
623.22 
830.88 
D4 
639.78 
765.55 
05 
567 .1 1 
770.55 
Overa11 
Mean RT 
629.04 
782.62 
Type II 
KB 
RL 
AG 
JB 
BR 
VM 
JP 
DM 
BB 
JM 
JA 
CR 
WF 
KG 
PC 
AL 
JW 
JOL 
HD 
WM 
GP 
CC 
873.50 
893.09 
1008.20 
845.09 
11 24.80 
938.24 
980.00 
623.00 
732.90 
950.13 
960.42 
697 .60 
744.78 
702.09 
630.20 
675.36 
1092.96 
1086.78 
747 .93 
1023.71 
773.18 
875.84 
795.60 
758.13 
894.76 
714.91 
1028.84 
725.96 
939.56 
562 .42 
709.51 
862.42 
860.47 
676.24 
725 .87 
646.42 
608.67 
662.00 
1019.71 
921.29 
714.64 
868.96 
752.44 
797.84 
865 .80 
829.1 1 
972 .89 
797 . 56 
1109.22 
654 . 1 I 
1117.22 
572.00 
737.40 
910.89 
924.67 
750.00 
827.00 
726 . 1 1 
620.70 
720.33 
1255.78 
998.78 
770.44 
958.89 
804.67 
872 . 33 
861 .00 
797.89 
958.44 
803.56 
1211 .44 
842.78 
987.56 
581.30 
770.80 
1011.67 
891 .22 
693.70 
753.78 
705 .67 
645 .00 
723.33 
1078 . 78 
951.89 
709.44 
900.67 
75 3 . 1 1 
807.22 
780.60 
714.33 
830.33 
653.00 
944.11 
713.78 
874.33 
541.20 
682.40 
873.89 
883.00 
620.70 
704 .00 
592 .44 
600. 20 
655 .00 
945 .1 1 
871.89 
698.67 
810.33 
746.79 
903.56 
754.70 
746.56 
894.67 
645.00 
921.89 
707.00 
848.44 
566.50 
681 .50 
781 .1 I 
81 4 .1 1 
673.00 
672 . 78 
607.44 
605.60 
605 . 78 
927.67 
894.33 
713.33 
881 .44 
734 . 1 1 
744 .44 
715.60 
702 . 78 
817.44 
675 .44 
957.56 
712.1 1 
870.22 
551 .00 
675 . 20 
734 .56 
789.33 
64 3.60 
671 .78 
600.44 
571.60 
605 .56 
891 .22 
889.56 
681.33 
793.44 
726.56 
761.67 
834.60 
825.61 
951 .48 
780.00 
1076.82 
832 . 10 
959.78 
592 . 7.1 
721.21 
906.28 
910.44 
686.95 
735.32 
674.26 
619.40 
668.68 
1056.33 
1004.03 
731 .29 
946.33 
762.81 
836.84 
Type 11A 
PB 
DW 
TH 
AJ 
JC 
DOW 
788.84 
1111.98 
678.75 
924.87 
741.89 
1066.73 
737.77 
943.64 
701 .46 
937.42 
774.89 
950.31 
730.33 
971.00 
758.33 
1155 .22 
904.00 
878.11 
776.33 
935 .56 
720.88 
979.00 
812.44 
1055.11 
716.1 1 
966.11 
722.50 
950.22 
700 .67 
1083.22 
740 .00 
901 .44 
644 . 30 
813.1 1 
713.78 
914.1 1 
726 .1 1 
944 .1 1 
661 .40 
789.55 
739.78 
821 .00 
763.31 
1027.81 
690.13 
931 .14 
758.01 
1008.52 
* A11 va1ues in msec 
